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Service standards in the provision of health and education in the states 
in India are low on average and also characterized by large inter-state 
disparities. These disparities are due to differences in fiscal capacity, differences 
in revenue effort and differences in priority accorded to the concerned sectors. 
The transfers from the central to state governments in many federations are 
guided by the equalization principle. Two important examples are Canada and 
Australia. When unconditional transfers are made, equalization transfers aim to 
neutralize deficiency in fiscal capacity but not that in revenue effort. Sometimes 
adjustments affecting cost and need factors may also be accommodated. Both in 
Canada and Australia, apart from general purpose and unconditional transfers, 
there are also specific purpose transfers. Considering the fact that it is important 
not only to improve the average levels of provisions of health and education 
services, but also to reduce disparities across states, the Twelfth Finance 
Commission has recommended special grants for health and education to 
selected states. In determining these grants, the TFC had kept the equalization 
principle in perspective and has not underwritten deficiency in expenditure if it 
arises because states accord less than average priority to the concerned sector. 
Recommended grants however only partially meet the requirement of resources 
for these sectors. For meeting the needs fully, much larger amounts would be 
involved. TFC’s initiative should be taken only as a beginning that requires 
supplementation by plan grants. After gaining experience in implementing these 
grants, larger grants and a more comprehensive approach can be developed.   1
1. Introduction 
 
Service standards in the provision of health and education in the 
states in India are inadequate on average. There are also large inter-state 
disparities in state level per capita expenditures on health and education. 
These translate into large differences in the health and education outcomes in 
the states. It is important therefore not only to improve the average levels of 
provisions of these services, which can be justified on grounds of nationwide 
positive externalities, but also reduce disparities across states. An equalization 
principle in determining service-specific grants can play an important role in a 
situation where, while the average expenditure on health and education may 
grow covering all states, for some states where service provisions are below 
average, expenditure on these heads needs to grow faster than the average, 
if they are to catch up.  
 
In fiscal transfers, under normal circumstances, equalizing transfers 
are given as general and unconditional transfers. It is for the sub-national 
government to determine the allocation among different heads according to 
its own priorities. In India, achievement of full fiscal capacity equalization has 
been constrained by several factors. In particular, large and growing inter-
state differentials in fiscal capacity, stable vertical imbalance, and multiple 
channels of fiscal transfers have resulted in a system that is progressive to a 
degree but not fully equalizing. The Twelfth Finance Commission (TFC) has 
considered it desirable that, pending major institutional changes, an attempt 
should be made to reduce inter-state differences in selected services faster 
than that for the average level of all services. The selected services are health 
and education.  As such the TFC, in its recent Report covering the period 
2005-10, made recommendations for conditional and specific purpose grants 
that are meant to reduce disparities in health and education for a number of 
states with below-average per capita expenditures on these services.   2
In this paper, we look at the methodology of determining health and 
education grants followed by the TFC, the proposed conditionalities, and the 
role that these transfers can play, as supplemented by other initiatives such 
as plan grants linked to the education cess in augmenting the level of health 
and education expenditures in the states. Section 1 briefly discusses the 
conceptual basis of equalization and examines the implications when 
equalization is attempted in a service specific perspective. Section 2 looks at 
the prevalent practices in regard to equalization transfers, particularly in 
Australia and Canada with a view to drawing some relevant comparisons. 
Section 3 provides a review of disparities in per capita expenditure in health 
and education. Section 4 provides an analysis of the methodology followed by 
the TFC within the context of an equalization approach. Section 5 looks at the 
actual amounts involved and the beneficiary states. Section 6 summarises the 
relevant conditionalities that have been prescribed by the Finance 
Commission. Section 7 provides concluding observations.  
 
1.  Fiscal Equalization: Conceptual Basis 
 
Fiscal equalization has become an established principle as well as 
practice in some of the important federal countries like Canada and Australia 
for determining transfers from the federal to the state governments.  Fiscal 
equalization provides a mechanism for ensuring, with the help of inter 
governmental transfers, that all states can provide comparable levels of 
services if they also undertook comparable revenue effort. However, in both 
Canada and Australia, unconditional transfers are supplemented by health 
and/or social sector grants that are distributed by a set of principles that are 
inherently equalizing in nature. In Canada, there are Canada Health Grants, 
and Canada Social Sector Transfers. In Australia also, apart from the general 
revenue sharing of revenues raised under the GST under the equalization 
principle, there are additional health care grants.    3
 
Both equity and efficiency arguments are used to justify equalization. 
It is also argued that in the context of equalization these are not necessarily 
in conflict. As Boadway (2001) observes: “fiscal equity does not conflict with 
fiscal efficiency: both depend on NFBs [net fiscal benefits] being equalized 
across jurisdictions”. Buchanan (1950) and Buchanan and Wagner (1971) had 
initially analysed the efficiency implications of equalization mainly using two 
concepts: ‘fiscal surplus’ and ‘congestible’ goods. Fiscal surpluses are the 
values citizens place on public and merit goods over and above the taxes they 
are required to pay to obtain the benefits arising from these goods. 
Congestible goods have the public good characteristic of its consumption 
being non-rivalrous only when a limited number of persons are sharing the 
benefit of the provision. As more people join as claimants for the benefit of 
the same service provision, the availability of services is reduced for the 
original participants. 
 
Migration is efficient if it is guided by location decisions based on 
individuals attempting to maximise their incomes by choosing to work in those 
states where they can be most productive. Such location decisions can be 
distorted and become inefficient if the existence of fiscal surpluses also enters 
in the calculus of their location decisions. As rich states can provide higher 
fiscal surpluses than poor states, i.e. in their case taxes paid are lower for a 
given level of benefit than that in a poor state, there is an incentive for 
migration from the poor to the rich states. The mechanism of equalization 
transfers eliminates differences in fiscal surplus, and renders locational 
decision-making efficient by making it dependent only on productivity 
differences. It is worthwhile for the richer states to bear the cost of 
redistribution implied by the equalization transfers, particularly in the context   4
of impure or congestible public goods like roads and other facilities that are 
fixed in size including public hospitals and educational institutions.   
    
In summary, the efficiency implications follow from two 
considerations:  
(a)  locational inefficiencies that can result from inefficient migration 
induced by fiscal surpluses is neutralized by equalization transfers; 
and  
(b)  The redistribution implied by equalization transfers from the richer 
to poorer states gives a return also to the richer states by avoiding 
congestion resulting from excessive migration in the context of 
services provided by these states that are in the nature of 
‘congestible’ goods. Education and health services are congestible 
and it is worthwhile equalizing their provision so that people do not 
migrate from one state to another just for differentials in the level 
of these services.   
 
2. Fiscal Equalization in Practice 
  
In practice, two prominent examples where the principle of making 
equalization transfers has been accepted and practiced are Canada and 
Australia, although the way it is implemented in the two countries is different 
in some important respects. The discussion below shows that unconditional 
equalization transfers are often supplemented by sector-specific transfers, 
particularly health and education. 
 
a. Canada 
In Canada, the ‘equalization’ payments have been mandated in the 
constitution since 1982, although these were being made earlier also. Section 
36(2) of the Constitution Act commits the federal government to the   5
“principle of making equalization payments to ensure that provincial 
governments have sufficient revenues to provide reasonably comparable 
levels of public services at reasonably comparable levels of taxation”. The 
equalization transfer to a province in absolute amount is determined by 
applying the average revenue effort to the difference between standard base 
and the actual base for that province with respect to the various revenue 
sources. This produces an estimate of revenue, which is higher than the 
actual revenue for provinces that have ‘below- average’ capacity. This 
exercise is done for all revenue bases used by the provinces. This leads to 
fiscal capacity equalization. In the Canadian system, there is no reference to 
cost differentials. Further, the states are free to use the equalised capacity in 
providing any mix of public goods and merit goods that they may want. 
Annexure 1 explains in brief the Canadian methodology of determining 
equalization grants. 
  
Apart from general equalization grants, in Canada, there is a provision 
of sector specific grants in the form of the Canada Health and Social Transfers 
(CHST), which has recently been divided into two parts, viz., Canada Health 
Grants and Canada Social Transfers, but the same basic principles apply. The 
latter includes secondary education. The CHST transfers are meant to support 
health care, boost secondary education and support social assistance and 
social services including early childhood development.  These transfers imply 
a degree of equalization since the determining principle for the CHST 
transfers effectively becomes the per capita amounts. The CHST has two 
forms, i.e. cash and tax transfer points.  The tax transfer arrangements were 
introduced in 1977 when the federal government agreed with the provincial 
and territorial governments to reduce its personal and corporate income tax 
rates by the margin of 13.5 percentage points and correspondingly allow the 
provinces to raise their tax rates by an equal margin.  This has been referred   6
to as the transfer of tax points and amounts to the vacation of tax room by 
the federal government in shared tax bases.  This has allowed the provinces 
to directly obtain the revenues from the relevant tax bases that would 
otherwise have accrued to the federal government. 
 
The CHST cash transfers are computed as a residual by subtracting 
the equivalent value of the tax points from provincial per capita total 
entitlements. The richer provinces gain larger amounts from the tax point 
transfers because their tax bases are larger.  The cash transfers are estimated 
broadly on per capita basis adjusted for the amounts calculated under the 
transfer of tax points. These transfers enable all provinces to meet a given 
level of per capita expenditure. Cash transfers are higher for lower fiscal 
capacity provinces. Hobson (2001) refers to this transfer, which raises the 
provinces to a common standard, as a sort of “super-equalization”. The 
methodology is explained in Annexure 2. It may also be mentioned that the 
amount transferred under the CHST including the imputed value of tax points 
transfers is larger than the unconditional equalization grants in Canada. 
 
b. Australia 
The Australian system of equalization transfers goes into the question 
of cost differentials relevant for comparison with some notion of equal 
efficiency in the provision of goods and services by the provincial authorities. 
The guiding principle of the horizontal transfer system is fiscal equalization, 
which is defined by the Commonwealth Grants Commission (CGC) as follows: 
“State governments should receive funding from the pool of goods and 
services tax revenue and health care grants such that, if each made the same 
effort to raise revenue from its own sources and operated at the same level of 
efficiency, each would have the capacity to provide services at the same 
standard”. The Australian equalization differs from the Canadian equalization   7
due to the reference to efficiency and standard of services. The Canadian 
system makes reference only to equalization in fiscal capacity. In Australia, 
fiscal equalization looks at both the revenue and expenditure sides. 
 
  The CGC’s calculations are based on all-state averages so that these 
may reflect average efficiency. There is a comprehensive coverage of the 
services provided by the states and the revenues raised by them. The first 
step in the equalization exercise is the preparation of the standard budget. 
The standards are equal to all-state averages in expenditures as well as 
revenues. Any departure from the average per capita expenditure needs to be 
justified on account of cost disabilities. The equalization budget brings 
together all expense and revenue categories of state budgets. The per capita 
expense for each service that the state would incur if it were to provide the 
Australian average standard of service is calculated. On the revenue side, the 
per capita revenue each state would raise if it applied the average revenue 
effort to its revenue base is calculated. Expenditure assessment adjusts the 
standard expenses to allow for the effects of disabilities.  
 
Disabilities are broadly classified as use disabilities and cost 
disabilities, according to whether they affect the rate of use or the cost of 
each unit of service. Use disabilities reflect differences between states in the 
use of services as a result of factors such as population characteristics and 
the availability of private services. Cost disabilities are influences that affect 
the cost per unit of service provided to particular groups or places, e.g. large 
cities or remote areas. On the revenue side, tax bases are generally measured 
using the value of transaction in each state that would be taxed under the 
average tax policy. For example, the value of the payroll tax is the estimated 
annual value of payrolls above a threshold level paid by the private sector 
businesses and most public trading enterprises.    8
 
In Australia, apart from the general purpose unconditional grants, 
there are also special purpose payments (SPPs). These are generally treated 
by inclusion within the exercise for determining equalization grants. In a few 
cases, however, these are treated by exclusion, which implies that these SPPs 
are taken as additionalities. Annexure 3 briefly describes the methodology for 
determining transfers in Australia.  
 
In summary, looking at the Canadian and Australian practices in adopting 
the equalization approach, the following features may be highlighted: 
a)  Equalization transfers make up for the deficiency in fiscal capacity but 
not that in revenue effort; if desired, cost differentials can be 
neutralized. 
b)  Equalization transfers are generally unconditional block transfers; the 
states are free to use them in whatever manner they desire; 
c)  The general purpose grants can be supplemented by specific purpose 
grants within the framework of equalization grants, as in the case of 
Canada Health and Social Transfers and a limited number of SPPs in 
the case of Australia. 
d)  Measurement of cost disabilities requires often a service by service 
approach as in the case of Australia, even though at the end of the 
process, all service specific entitlements are clubbed together and a 




In India, for most of the early Finance Commissions, transfers 
followed a fragmented approach with different components of tax devolution 
being subjected to different considerations and the unconditional grants 
followed a gap-filling approach. Since different agencies dealing with transfers   9
follow different approaches, without much coordination, a unified approach to 
transfers has not been developed. The net outcome of this segmentation has 
been that transfers have been far from equalizing. While extensive disparities 
have been present, the progressivity or the redistributive content of transfers 
has been limited, particularly when implicit transfers are also taken into 
account.  
 
Although the importance of equalization as a guiding principle in 
determining transfers to states has been recognized by the Twelfth Finance 
Commission (TFC), the redistribution that a full fledged equalization may 
involve may be considerably larger than what is shown by historical trends. In 
a recent study, Bagchi and Chakraborty (2004) have shown that with 
equalization attempted with macro indicators and in a broad manner, the 
poorer states should obtain a transfer larger than what was obtained by them 
under the recommendations of some of the previous Finance Commissions by 
margins of about 48 to 50 per cent.  
 
There are some important constraints on following a full-fledged equalization 
approach in India, as listed below. 
 
a)  The extent of disparities in fiscal capacities is very large, and the 
required re-distribution through transfers would be very large. 
b)  If a minimum amount of vertical transfer is to be made including the 
richer states, the required amount of total transfer would also be very 
large. 
c)  Existence of multiple channels of transfers makes it difficult to 
develop an integrated approach to transfers. 
d) There are various data problems in following an equalization 
approach even at a macro level.   10
Taking these difficulties in view, the TFC decided to supplement its 
overall unconditional transfers that are equalizing but only to a limited 
degree, by a more direct attention on two sectors for purposes of 
equalization, namely, education and health. Although even in the case of 
theses services full equalization was not attempted, since only 15 and 30 per 
cent of the difference from the average, respectively for education and 
health, was covered. By making these grants conditional, the TFC has sought 
to address the problem of disparities in two crucial services that are in the 
nature of merit goods. 
 
It is not as if such an attempt has been made by a Finance 
Commission for the first time. Specific grants meant for social sectors have 
been recommended by previous Finance Commissions. The first Finance 
Commission had given grants for primary education for the states of Bihar, 
Hyderabad, Madhya Bharat, Madhya Pradesh, Orissa, Patiala and East Punjab 
States Union, Punjab, and Rajasthan. The Third Finance Commission had 
recommended a set of grants for the improvement of Communication for a 
limited number of states. Eighth Commission onwards, certain grants called 
‘upgradation’ grants have been recommended, which were in the nature of 
specific purpose grants. However, it is for the first time that the Twelfth 
Finance Commission has taken up education and health as two major merit 
services where an attempt needs to be made to reduce inequalities across 
states in the level of service provision.  
 
3. Inter-State Disparities in India: Health and Education 
 
In India, the disparities across states in respect of per capita 
government expenditures on health and education are large, and accordingly, 
the outcomes also show wide differences. In this section, we look at the 
profile of these disparities, as analyzed by the Twelfth Finance Commission.   11
The inter-state pattern of per capita government expenditures, particularly in 
social and economic services shows the prevailing disparities in respect of 
publically provided services. Table 1 shows per capita average state 
government expenditures over the period 1998-99 to 2000-01 in general, 
social, and economic services. The TFC excluded from the general services, 
interest payment, pensions, and lotteries and focused on the general category 
states except Goa but including Assam for the purpose of this analysis. Within 
the social sector expenditures, per capita expenditures on education, health, 
and water supply and sanitation are also shown. States are arranged in 
ascending order of per capita GSDP. The general pattern is that states with 
low per capita GSDPs also have low per capita expenditures. The ratio of 
minimum to maximum expenditure and that of minimum to mean expenditure 
indicates that in the case of general category states, for social services as a 
whole, the minimum per capita expenditure is 35 per cent of the maximum 
and 46 per cent of the mean. In the case of education, the minimum to mean 
ratio is 57 per cent and that with respect to maximum per capita expenditure 
is only 43 per cent. The corresponding figures are 45 per cent and 34 per 
cent for health and water supply and sanitation. These figures cover both 
non-plan and plan revenue expenditures. 
   12
Table 1:  Per capita expenditure on General, Social & Economic Services 
(Rs.) 
States  1998-99 to 2000-01  1998-99 to 2000-01 
   GEN SOC ECO  EDN  HTH WSS 
Bihar 182.20  460.22  198.29  311.14  38.89  19.13 
Orissa 224.20  931.18  406.54  463.08  68.31  56.18 
Uttar Pradesh  208.88  549.54  318.14  340.41  52.74  19.96 
Assam 334.39  929.88  369.27  615.21  64.58  59.23 
Madhya Pradesh  228.19  697.03  411.75  344.49  70.08  63.38 
Rajasthan 265.36  1020.65  405.00  545.30  101.98  111.46 
West Bengal  262.41  958.23  392.62  512.29  107.77  42.51 
Andhra Pradesh  264.50  905.72  623.67  411.70  83.61  57.72 
Kerala 328.99  1254.80  716.48  713.26  131.37  52.35 
Karnataka 279.17  1083.89  755.77  558.33  59.28  60.27 
Tamil Nadu  321.50  1240.90  685.30  651.46  110.81  38.34 
Gujarat  276.34 1331.35 1285.75  664.44 109.55  39.03 
Haryana 320.94  1145.38  902.40  587.60  73.14  102.14 
Maharashtra 639.84  1276.05  647.73  730.93  59.69  79.69 
Punjab 533.63  1220.48  733.94  716.27  178.32  55.04 
Coefficient of 
variation  39.24 26.62 46.93  26.30  41.49 45.11 
Min/Max  0.28 0.35 0.15  0.43  0.22 0.17 
Min/Mean  0.59 0.46 0.34  0.57  0.45 0.34 
Source: Report of the Twelfth Finance Commission       
Note:   Per capita Revenue Expenditure on General Services is net of Interest Payments 
and Pension & Lottery. 
 
 
However, it is not just the level of per capita expenditure, but also the impact 
of these expenditures on health and educational outcomes in the states that 
matters. This is best captured by the index of Human Development. The TFC 
gives an ordinal comparison in terms of the HDI based on information 
provided by the UNDP office in Delhi, which had prepared for the Finance 
Commission, the HDI index for 2001. HDI is available for 1981 and 1991 as 
prepared by the Planning Commission.  According to the UNDP estimates, as 
summarised in Table 2, the lowest ranked state is Bihar, followed by Uttar   13
Pradesh, Orissa, and Madhya Pradesh. There is a clear positive relationship, 
as expected, between per capita GSDP and the HDI. At the same time, states, 
which have provided more in terms of per capita budgetary expenditures on 
health and education, have ranks that are higher than their relative position in 
the ranking of per capita GSDP. This is so also for the special category states. 
It is notable that the special category states do better in the HDI.  
 
Table 2: Human Development Index: Comparison Across States 
High       
Goa, Kerala, Maharashtra, Mizoram    
High Middle       
Gujarat, Manipur, Nagaland, Punjab, Sikkim,  
Tamil Nadu       
Middle    
Andhra Pradesh, Arunachal Pradesh, Haryana 
Himachal Pradesh, Meghalaya, Karnataka 
Tripura, West Bengal, Uttaranchal   
Lower Middle       
Assam, Chattisgarh, J &K, Jharkhand, Rajasthan 
        
Low    
Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Orissa, Uttar Pradesh 
    
Source: Report of the Twelfth Finance Commission, 2004. 
 
In this section, we also make a broad comparison of priority given by 
selected states to the sectors of education and health as measured by the 
share of the sector in total expenditure excluding interest payments and 
pensions, called non-pension primary expenditure. It is clear that there are 
large differences in the relative share of expenditure on health and education 
relative to total expenditure adjusted for pensions and interest payments. The 
policy message is also clear. While a transfer mechanism that aims at 
minimizing health and education sector outcomes can correct for fiscal   14
deficiency that translates into capacity to spend, it should not make up for 
lack of preference or priority expressed by the state relative to the average. 
At the same time, states spending much below average relative to their 
expenditures should be induced to allocate more of available resources to 
these sectors, particularly if the service levels are less than average in these 
sectors. 
 
  Table 3 provides a comparison of expenditure on education, covering 
major heads 2202 to 2205 relative to non-pension primary expenditure for the 
general category states. The variation in these ratios is quite remarkable. 
While the maximum ratio is for Kerala at more than 30 per cent for most 
years, the minimum is that for Madhya Pradesh, which has been around 14 
per cent in most years. The average ratio shows a small but persistent 
increase over the years rising from 19.4 per cent in 1993-94 to 21.4 per cent 
by 2002-03, which seems to be a welcome trend.  
   15
Table 3 : Share of Expenditure on Education as Percentage of Primary 
Expenditure excluding Pension Payments 
(Percent) 
   1993-94  1994-95  1995-96  1996-97  1997-98 
Andhra Pradesh  15.84  15.84  14.39  14.61  14.85 
Bihar 26.69  27.25  29.91  30.58  27.77 
Goa 17.01  16.66  16.51  17.00  20.77 
Gujarat 19.99  19.85  20.85  19.52  18.23 
Haryana 15.00  12.17  13.46  14.20  15.64 
Karnataka 15.90  16.38  15.69  15.39  18.25 
Kerala 30.06  29.79  27.02  26.20  22.88 
Madhya Pradesh  14.83  15.41  16.23  14.40  14.49 
Maharashtra 18.17  15.88  17.64  17.28  19.36 
Orissa 17.87  17.41  18.13  15.16  16.42 
Punjab 17.23  16.17  17.87  17.93  17.96 
Rajasthan 17.73  18.02  16.68  18.72  20.60 
Tamil Nadu  20.08  19.04  20.05  18.85  19.68 
Uttar Pradesh  18.45  17.84  20.77  20.01  19.16 
West Bengal  25.67  23.72  23.64  23.36  24.54 
Average 19.37  18.76  19.26  18.88  19.37 
Maximum 30.06  29.79  29.91  30.58  27.77 
Minimum 14.83  12.17  13.46  14.20  14.49 
   1998-99  1999-2000  2000-01  2001-02  2002-03 
Andhra Pradesh  14.10  16.85  16.52  15.08  15.63 
Bihar 25.48  30.34  31.79  31.67  28.46 
Goa 19.97  19.63  16.19  15.39  16.81 
Gujarat 19.56  18.90  15.79  16.13  19.59 
Haryana 17.22  17.95  17.60  16.34  18.99 
Karnataka 18.08  18.07  18.71  16.31  17.79 
Kerala 24.31  28.33  29.39  29.62  27.27 
Madhya Pradesh  17.34  18.07  17.93  13.89  14.23 
Maharashtra 19.97  22.80  26.91  28.23  24.20 
Orissa 15.93  16.61  17.10  18.08  22.46 
Punjab 22.15  23.31  19.75  18.18  23.73 
Rajasthan 23.31  24.53  23.57  23.72  23.66 
Tamil Nadu  23.63  25.04  23.77  23.54  19.43 
Uttar Pradesh  23.73  21.27  21.81  21.87  20.75 
West Bengal  23.24  29.87  23.99  24.20  28.11 
Average 20.53  22.10  21.39  20.82  21.41 
Maximum 25.48  30.34  31.79  31.67  28.46 
Minimum 14.10  16.61  15.79  13.89  14.23 
Source( Basic Data): Finance Accounts, State Governments   16
In the case of education, the states that are below average in terms 
of priority accorded to education are Andhra Pradesh, Goa, Gujarat, Haryana, 
Karnataka, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Orissa, Punjab, Rajasthan, and to 
some extent, Uttar Pradesh. Among these, the hard cases are those where 
both resources and priority are low. These are: Madhya Pradesh, Orissa, and 
Rajasthan 
 
Chart 1: Share of Expenditure on Education as % Non-Pension Primary 

















An additional notable feature is that the share of expenditure on 
education as percentage of the corresponding average share seems to have 
come down for three of the five low income states, viz., Madhya Pradesh, 
Orissa and Uttar Pradesh. In Rajasthan, it has been close to average. The   17
period from the late nineties to the first three years of the new decade 
represents a period when state finances were under considerable pressure. 
The low income states adjusted the priority accorded to education downwards 
although the pattern of adjustment may be different. In the case of Bihar, the 
relative share has been higher than 100 per cent throughout this period 
(Chart 1). The corresponding relative shares for all the general category 
states are given in Appendix Table 3. 
 
A similar analysis for health, covering major heads 2210 and 2211, 
indicates, as shown in Table 4, that the position of highest allocation among 
states given to health  is shared between West Bengal and Kerala in different 
years. However, in their case, this share is in the range of 6 to 7.5  per cent, 
which is only one-third of the average share in education. The average share 
of expenditure on health is only in the range of 4.31 to 4.77 per cent, which is 
a little above 20 per cent of the average share of expenditure in education. 
States that show below-average allocation to health are Andhra Pradesh, 
Gujarat, Haryana, Karnataka,  Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, and Orissa. In 
more recent years, Tamil Nadu is also below average. Uttar Pradesh is 
marginally below average. The hard cases in this case are also those where 
both resources and priority is relatively less. States like Madhya Pradesh and 
Orissa fall in this category (Chart 2). 
   18
Chart 2: Share of Expenditure on Health as % Non-Pension Primary 
















The priority relative to average for the five low income states 
shows that it is less than average in Madhya Pradesh, Orissa, Bihar, and 
Rajasthan for most of the years. There is also the general indication that 
in fiscally difficult years, the poorer states have adjusted the priority 
downwards relative to the average, except for Orissa where the ratio 
was low to begin with.    19
Table 4 : Share of Expenditure on Health as Percentage of Primary 
Expenditure excluding Pension Payments 
( Per cent) 
   1993-94  1994-95  1995-96  1996-97  1997-98 
Andhra Pradesh  4.30  3.87  3.72  3.98  3.81 
Bihar 4.54  4.63  4.46  4.88  4.41 
Goa 6.31  6.02  5.78  6.22  6.00 
Gujarat 4.78  4.81  4.78  4.47  4.16 
Haryana 3.04  2.48  2.73  2.75  3.00 
Karnataka 4.01  4.02  3.40  3.13  3.59 
Kerala 6.11  6.10  5.93  5.64  5.09 
Madhya Pradesh  3.17  3.45  3.34  3.18  3.48 
Maharashtra 3.73  3.24  3.40  3.09  3.50 
Orissa 3.54  3.49  3.57  3.69  3.82 
Punjab 4.75  4.59  4.48  4.78  4.89 
Rajasthan 4.44  4.45  4.01  4.39  4.66 
Tamil Nadu  4.60  4.29  4.72  4.11  4.54 
Uttar Pradesh  5.24  4.14  5.04  4.70  5.36 
West Bengal  6.87  6.08  6.20  5.67  6.48 
Average 4.63  4.38  4.37  4.31  4.45 
Maximum 6.87  6.10  6.20  6.22  6.48 
Minimum 3.04  2.48  2.73  2.75  3.00 
   1998-99  1999-2000  2000-01  2001-02  2002-03 
Andhra Pradesh  3.66  4.05  3.92  3.79  3.96 
Bihar 4.37  4.21  4.55  4.55  4.33 
Goa 6.37  5.91  5.20  5.08  4.93 
Gujarat 4.57  4.63  3.39  3.21  4.08 
Haryana 3.37  3.46  3.23  2.81  3.31 
Karnataka 4.01  4.31  3.88  3.63  3.82 
Kerala 5.54  6.22  6.44  7.44  6.00 
Madhya Pradesh  4.40  3.98  4.32  3.17  3.48 
Maharashtra 3.45  3.54  3.65  4.05  3.58 
Orissa 4.02  3.55  3.87  3.72  4.72 
Punjab 6.50  6.69  5.69  5.45  6.41 
Rajasthan 5.50  5.44  5.36  5.31  5.24 
Tamil Nadu  5.15  5.19  4.87  4.98  4.23 
Uttar Pradesh  4.45  4.17  4.14  4.21  4.39 
West Bengal  7.37  6.15  5.85  5.88  7.14 
Average 4.85  4.77  4.56  4.48  4.64 
Maximum 7.37  6.69  6.44  7.44  7.14 
Minimum 3.37  3.46  3.23  2.81  3.31 
Source( Basic Data): Finance Accounts, State Governments   
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4.  Estimating Health and Education Grants: Methodology 
 
  In devising a grant that is specific-purpose and aimed at given 
sectors, it is important to make up for the deficiency in resources that are 
normatively assessed but not to underwrite the deficiency in priority accorded 
to the sector by the concerned state government. It is also useful to set 
benchmarks for comparable groups of states with a view to at least broadly 
neutralizing group-level cost differentials. The TFC methodology can be 
described in two steps: 
a. Derivation of the average preference for allocation to health and 
education (say a) 
b.  Derivation of the gap of the state-specific expenditure on the concerned 
service (education/health) from the corresponding group average 
(general category/ special category states) evaluated by applying the 
average preference to the state’s aggregate expenditure.  
 
Thus for, any service, suppose that the group average per capita expenditure 
is z and state-specific expenditure for a state, zi. Here, 
 
                                      z= ∑zi Ni/∑ Ni 
 
Subscript i varies over the states belonging to the relevant group. The per 
capita capacity of a state is given by ri and the average capacity is given by  
                                              r= ∑ri Ni/∑ Ni 
 The average budgetary allocation for the given service is given by 
                                      a  = ∑zi Ni/∑ri Ni 
Thus,                            z=a.r and  zi = a i.ri .  
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Actual gap in expenditure between a state and the group-average can be 
seen as the sum of two components: one due to deficiency in fiscal capacity 
and the other due to giving the concerned sector less than average 
preference. It is only the first part, that is deficiency in expenditure due to 
lack of capacity, that is taken into account while the deficiency that results 
from giving less than average preference in budgetary allocation  is ignored. 
Thus, the actual gap may be written as: 
 
   z - z  i  = (z- ar i)+ (ar i –z i) 
or,                                z-z i  = a(r- r i)+ (a- a i )r i  [where a i =z i /r i ] 
                               
Thus, the relevant gap is reflected in the first term, which is due to 
the deficiency in the fiscal capacity, given the average allocation to the 
concerned sector. The second term is the difference due to allocating less 
than average share given the capacity of the state, and this difference does 
not require to be made up under the equalization principle. Thus, the total 
grant should be determined by N i a(r- r i).  
 
In estimating the resources, r is proxied by resources devoted to 
expenditure excluding interest payments and pensions. Some other 
adjustments were also made by the TFC to make inter-state revenue and 
expenditure data more comparable. Two services that are considered for the 
purpose are:  
(a) Expenditure on education (major head 2202); and  
(b) Expenditure on health (major heads 2210 and 2211). 
 
In explaining the methodology, the TFC observes as follows: “For this 
purpose, the expenditure data (both plan and non-plan) of each of the states 
for 2002-03 were examined. In the case of education, the ratio of revenue   22
expenditure under the major head 2002 (plan and non-plan) was worked out 
for each state with reference to its “adjusted” total revenue expenditure (plan 
and non-plan). While working out this ratio, expenditure relating to pensions, 
interest payments and other adjustment items …were excluded from non-plan 
revenue expenditure for arriving at the “adjusted” total revenue expenditure. 
Thereafter, average ratios were worked out for special and non-special 
category states. Those states, whose ratio was less than their respective 
group average, were deemed as having low expenditure preference in regard 
to the education sector, in the sense that these states were not spending (as 
percentage of revenue expenditure) what other states in their group were 
able to do. This low expenditure preference was corrected by normatively 
assigning the respective group average ratio to those states that were below 
the average. After this adjustment, the corrected per capita revenue 
expenditure relating to education (both under plan and non-plan put 
together) for each state for 2002-03 was worked out. Thereafter, average per 
capita expenditure was worked out for the two groups of special and non-
special category states. Those states, whose per capita expenditure was less 
than their group average, were reckoned as needing financial assistance, 
because their lower expenditure could be on account of low fiscal capacity.”  
 
The TFC estimated the amount of grant required for covering 15 
percent of the distance by which a below-average state was lagging behind 
its group average of per capita expenditure (after having adjusted for low 
expenditure preference). The 15 percent distance is with reference to both 
plan and non-plan revenue expenditure. The distance from the average after 
preference correction was made to the extent of 30 per cent for health. This 
partial equalization was mainly due to a resource constraint. The TFC 
observes: “The extent of equalisation is, however, limited by the availability of 
resources”. 
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The resultant amounts were determined first for the year 2002-03. 
The next step was to bring it forward to the base year, namely, 2004-05. A 
growth rate equal to the group’s trend growth rate over 1993-2003 was 
applied on the 2002-03 figure to come to 2004-05. For the award period 
2005-10, a growth rate of 9.5 per cent was applied on the base year figures. 
This was consistent with the overall assessment exercise. In the case of 
health, the growth rate applied for the forecast period was 11.5 per cent. A 
minimum amount for the qualifying state in any one year was also prescribed 
at Rs. 20 crore in the case of education and Rs.10 crore in the case of health. 
The recommended grants for education and health are given in Tables 5 and 
6.    24
Table 5: Education: TFC Equalization Grants 
 
(Rs.crore) 
  2005-06 2006-07 2007-08 2008-09 2009-10  Total 
Assam 183.2  200.6 219.66 240.53 263.38  1107.37 
Bihar 443.99  486.17 532.36 582.93 638.31  2683.76 
Jharkhand  107.82 118.06 129.28 141.56 155.01 651.73 
Madhya Pradesh 76.03  83.25 91.16 99.82 109.3  459.56 
Orissa  53.49 58.57 64.13 70.22 76.89 323.3 
Rajasthan 20  20 20 20 20  100 
Uttar Pradesh  736.87  806.87 883.52 967.45 1059.36  4454.07 
West Bengal  64.83  70.99 77.73 85.11 93.2  391.86 
1686.23 1844.51 2017.84 2207.62 2415.45  10171.65 
Source: Report of the Twelfth Finance Commission, 2004 
 
 
In the case of education, the total amount involved is Rs. 10171.65 
crore. Eight states out of twenty-eight states were adjudged to be entitled for 
these grants. There is another channel available to all the states in the form 
of Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan for implementing the growth plans in respect of 
education. In the case of health, the total amount of grant is Rs. 5887.08 
crore and seven states were assessed to be entitled for these grants. 
 
 
Table 6: Health: TFC Equalization Grants 
(Rs. Crore) 
  2005-06 2006-07 2007-08 2008-09 2009-10  Total 
Assam 153.58  171.24 190.93 212.89 237.38  966.02
Bihar 289.3  322.57 359.66 401.02 447.14  1819.69
Jharkhand 57.39  63.99 71.35 79.55 88.7  360.98
Madhya Pradesh  28.88  32.2 35.9 40.03 44.63  181.64
Orissa 31.22  34.81 38.81 43.28 48.25  196.37
Uttar Pradesh  367.63  409.9 457.04 509.6 568.21  2312.38
Uttaranchal 10  10 10 10 10  50
 938  1044.71 1163.69 1296.37 1444.31  5887.08
Source: Report of the Twelfth Finance Commission, 2004   
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The additional expenditure enabled by these grants is likely to be 
efficiency augmenting for the following reasons: 
a. Existing non-plan expenditures have become highly salary-
intensive with suitable complementary expenditures in education 
(e.g., teaching aids, maintenance of school building) and health 
(e.g., medicines, diagnostic facilities) not being available for want 
of budgetary resources, rendering the large salary expenditures 
also operate at less than desired efficiency; and 
b.  Enabling states to shift some old plan schemes that are still being 
carried as part of the current plan on to the non-plan side, 
thereby creating space for undertaking genuinely new plan 




The TFC has noted that these grants are being provided for the 
education and health sectors as an additionality, over and above the normal 
expenditure by the states in these sectors. These grants are earmarked for 
utilisation only for the respective sectors (non-plan), i.e., major head 2202 in 
the case of education and major heads 2210 & 2211 in the case of health. 
Conditionalities governing the releases and utilisation of these grants have 
been specified in Annexures 10.1 to 10.3 of the TFC Report. It was also 
envisaged that no further conditionalities should be imposed by the central 
government for the release of these grants. Monitoring of the expenditure 
relating to these grants will rest with the state government concerned. In 
effect, there are two types of conditionalities envisaged as given below: 
a. Monitoring  Committee 
b.  Minimum nominal expenditure thresholds 
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a. Monitoring Committee 
  With a view to ensuring that the end objectives associated with these 
grants are achieved, the TFC desired that a robust monitoring mechanism 
should be put in place. The Commission recommended that every state 
should constitute a high level committee for monitoring proper utilisation of 
grants. The committee should be responsible for monitoring both financial 
and physical targets and for ensuring adherence to the specific conditionalities 
applicable. In the beginning of the year, the committee may approve the 
projects to be undertaken in each sector, quantify the targets, both in 
physical and financial terms, and lay down the time period for achieving 
specific milestones. 
 
  The high level monitoring committee should be headed by the Chief 
Secretary with the Finance Secretary and the secretaries/heads of 
departments concerned as members. The committee should meet at least 
once in every quarter to review the utilisation of the grants and to issue 
directions for mid-course correction, if considered necessary. Table 7 and 
Appendix Tables 1 and 2 describe the conditionalities prescribed by the TFC 
and correspond respectively to Annexures 10.1, 10.2, and 10.3 of the TFC 
report, respectively. 
 
b. Minimum Nominal Expenditure Thresholds 
  
The TFC has ruled out any possibility of substitution of grants for own 
funds that may be diverted to other heads by ensuring that it is taken as an 
additionality. This has been done by prescribing a path of growth of 
expenditure on education and health in two parts: expenditure on the basis of 
normal growth and the additionality due to grant. A beneficiary state has to 
progressively increase expenditure on both counts. While the additionality 
above the prescribed growth would come from the recommended grant, the   27
prescribed growth in the expenditure on health and education would come 
from own sources. Diversion of funds would imply that the state would forgo 
subsequent instalments of the grant. The details of the thresholds are given 
in Table 7. 
 
c. Supplementation through Plan Grants 
  
Apart from these grants recommended by the Finance Commission, a 
below average state can have a further additionality coming from plan funds, 
particularly from schemes like the Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan, although the 
amounts would depend on the allocation formulae followed by the Planning 
Commission in respect of such earmarked funds.   
Table 7: [Annexure 10.1 of TFC Report] 
 
 
Conditionality for Release of Grants-in-Aid for Education 
(Major Head 2202) and Health (Major Heads 2210 & 2211) 
 
1.  The grant should be utilised only for meeting the non-plan revenue 
expenditure under the respective major heads (i.e., major head 2202 
in the case of education and major heads 2210 & 2211 in the case of 
health). 
 
2.  The grant may be allocated in two equal instalments in each financial 
year. While there will be no pre-condition for release of the first 
instalment in any year, the second instalment will be released on the 
fulfilment of the conditions laid down in para 3 below. 
 
3.  Pre-conditions for release of the second instalment in a year will be as 
follows: 
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Year  Condition for Release of Second Instalment 
2005-06  2005-06 BE under NPRE of the relevant head should not be less 
than the projected “total NPRE” for 2005-06, as shown in 
annexure 10.2/10.3. 
  
2006-07  2006-07 BE under NPRE of the relevant head should not be less 
than the projected “total NPRE” for 2006-07, as shown in 
annexure 10.2/10.3. 
  And 
  2005-06 RE for NPRE of the relevant head should not be less 
than the total of “normal expenditure” as shown in annexure 
10.2/10.3 plus the actual release of the “grant” for 2005-06. 
2007-08  2007-08 BE under NPRE of the relevant head should not be less 
than the projected “total NPRE” for 2007-08, as shown in 
annexure 10.2/10.3. 
  And 
  
  Actuals of 2005-06 for NPRE of the relevant head should not be 
less than the total of “normal expenditure” as shown in 
annexure 10.2/10.3 plus the actual release of the “grant” for 
2005-06. 
2008-09  2008-09 BE under NPRE of the relevant head should not be less 
than the projected “total NPRE” for 2008-09, as shown in 
annexure 10.2/10.3. 
  And 
  
  Actuals of 2006-07 for NPRE of the relevant head should not be 
less than the total of “normal expenditure” as shown in 
annexure 10.2/10.3 plus the actual release of the “grant” for 
2006-07. 
  
2009-10  2009-10 BE under NPRE of the relevant head should not be less 
than the projected “total NPRE” for 2009-10, as shown in 
annexure 10.2/10.3. 
  And 
  
  Actuals of 2007-08 for NPRE of the relevant head should not be 
less than the total of “normal expenditure” as shown in 
annexure 10.2/10.3 plus the actual release of the “grant” for 
2007-08. 
Note: Annexure 10.3 is in respect of education and annexure 10.3 is in 
respect of health. 
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7. Summary 
 
  This paper looks at the conceptual basis of equalization grants 
recommended by the Twelfth Finance Commission in respect of health and 
education. Conditional and specific purpose grants have occasionally been 
given by earlier Finance Commission also. Separate grants for covering some 
aspects of education and health are prevalent in other federal countries 
including Canada and Australia. In Canada, where a fiscal capacity 
equalization is attempted by means of unconditional grants, these are 
supplemented by separate grants on health and social transfers that are also 
derived within the overall framework of equalization, which some authors 
have referred to as ‘super-equalization’. In Australia, equalization is attempted 
by looking at individual services although in the end unconditional block 
grants are given. In India, it has not been possible to achieve full equalization 
because the extent of transfers and the degree of redistribution required for 
this purpose are too large relative to available transferable resources unless a 
sharp departure from existing practices is undertaken. The TFC has decided 
to make a limited beginning by recommending grants determined on the basis 
of equalization principles for two specific sectors, namely, health and 
education. These grants, supplemented by suitably distributed plan grants, 
are likely to reduce the inter-state disparities in these two vital services that 
are in the nature of merit goods. To ensure that states do not divert the 
available health and education grants to other uses, a strict monitoring 
framework has been recommended. In future, the extent of equalization in 
these grants should be increased from 15 per cent in the case of education 
and 30 per cent in the case of health to 100 per cent and the monitoring 
framework should be reexamined in the light of experience gained during the 
TFC’s award period.    30
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Appendix Table 1 [Annexure 10.2 of TFC Report] 
Projection for Non-Plan Revenue Expenditure on Education (MH 2202) 
       (Rs. in crore) 
State 2005-06  2006-07  2007-08  2008-09  2009-10  2005-10 
(1) (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
Assam          
Normal Expenditure  2125.60  2327.54  2548.65  2790.77  3055.90  12848.46 
Grant 183.20  200.60  219.66  240.53  263.38  1107.37 
Total NPRE  2308.80 2528.14 2768.31  3031.30  3319.28  13955.83 
Bihar          
Normal Expenditure  3376.63  3697.41  4048.66  4433.29  4854.45  20410.44 
Grant 443.99  486.17  532.36  582.93  638.31  2683.76 
Total NPRE  3820.62 4183.58 4581.02  5016.22  5492.76  23094.20 
Jharkhand          
Normal Expenditure  1177.70  1289.58  1412.09  1546.24  1693.13  7118.74 
Grant 107.82  118.06  129.28  141.56  155.01  651.73 
Total NPRE  1285.52 1407.64 1541.37  1687.80  1848.14 7770.47 
Madhya Pradesh          
Normal Expenditure  2056.74  2252.13  2466.08  2700.36  2956.89  12432.20 
Grant 76.03  83.25  91.16  99.82  109.30  459.56 
Total NPRE  2132.77 2335.38 2557.24  2800.18  3066.19  12891.76 
Orissa          
Normal Expenditure  1886.98  2066.24  2262.54  2477.48  2712.84  11406.08 
Grant 53.49  58.57  64.13  70.22  76.89  323.30 
Total NPRE  1940.47 2124.81 2326.67  2547.70  2789.73  11729.38 
Rajasthan          
Normal Expenditure  3960.41  4336.65  4748.63  5199.75  5693.72  23939.16 
Grant 20.00  20.00  20.00  20.00  20.00  100.00 
Total NPRE  3980.41 4356.65 4768.63  5219.75  5713.72  24039.16 
Uttar Pradesh          
Normal Expenditure  6510.06  7128.52  7805.73  8547.27  9359.27  39350.85 
Grant 736.87  806.87  883.52  967.45  1059.36  4454.07 
Total NPRE  7246.93 7935.39 8689.25  9514.72  10418.63  43804.92 
West Bengal          
Normal Expenditure  5029.25  5507.03  6030.19  6603.06  7230.35  30399.88 
Grant 64.83  70.99  77.73  85.11  93.20  391.86 
Total NPRE  5094.08 5578.02 6107.92  6688.17  7323.55  30791.74 
            
Total Normal 
Expenditure 
26123.37 28605.10 31322.57  34298.22  37556.55  157905.81 
Total Grant  1686.23  1844.51  2017.84  2207.62  2415.45  10171.65 
Grand Total NPRE  27809.60  30449.61  33340.41  36505.84  39972.00  168077.46 
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Appendix Table 2 [Annexure 10.3 of TFC Report] 
Projection for Non-Plan Revenue Expenditure on Health Sector (MH 2210 & 2211) 
             (Rs.  in  crore) 
State 2005-06  2006-07  2007-08  2008-09  2009-10  2005-10 
(1) (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
            
Assam          
Normal Expenditure  196.94 219.58  244.84 272.99 304.39 1238.74 
Grant 153.58  171.24  190.93  212.89  237.38  966.02 
Total NPRE  350.52 390.82  435.77 485.88 541.77 2204.76 
            
Bihar          
Normal Expenditure  500.82 558.41  622.63 694.23 774.07 3150.16 
Grant 289.30  322.57  359.66  401.02  447.14  1819.69 
Total NPRE  790.12 880.98  982.29  1095.25  1221.21 4969.85 
            
Jharkhand          
Normal Expenditure  219.74 245.01  273.19 304.60 339.63 1382.17 
Grant 57.39  63.99  71.35  79.55  88.70  360.98 
Total NPRE  277.13 309.00  344.54 384.15 428.33 1743.15 
            
Madhya Pradesh          
Normal Expenditure  607.66 677.55  755.46 842.34 939.21 3822.22 
Grant 28.88  32.20  35.90  40.03  44.63  181.64 
Total NPRE  636.54 709.75  791.36 882.37 983.84 4003.86 
            
Orissa          
Normal Expenditure  434.88 484.90  540.66 602.83 672.16 2735.43 
Grant 31.22  34.81  38.81  43.28  48.25  196.37 
Total NPRE  466.10 519.71  579.47 646.11 720.41 2931.80 
            
Uttar Pradesh          
Normal Expenditure  1610.74 1795.97  2002.51 2232.80 2489.57 10131.59 
Grant 367.63  409.90  457.04  509.60  568.21  2312.38 
Total NPRE  1978.37 2205.87  2459.55 2742.40 3057.78 12443.97 
            
Uttaranchal          
Normal Expenditure  161.73 180.32  201.06 224.18 249.96 1017.25 
Grant 10.00  10.00  10.00  10.00  10.00  50.00 
Total NPRE  171.73 190.32  211.06 234.18 259.96 1067.25 
            
Total Normal 
Expenditure 
3732.51 4161.74  4640.35 5173.97 5768.99 23477.56 
Total Grant  938.00  1044.71  1163.69  1296.37  1444.31  5887.08 
Grand Total NPRE  4670.51  5206.45 5804.04  6470.34  7213.30  29364.64 
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Appendix Table 3:Share of Expenditure on Education as Percentage of Primary Expenditure excluding Pension 
Payments Relative to Average  
(per cent) 
                      1993-94 1994-95 1995-96 1996-97 1997-98 1998-99 1999-2000 2000-01 2001-02 2002-03
Andhra Pradesh  81.80  84.41  74.72  77.39            76.64 68.67 76.24  77.25 72.45 73.00
Bihar 137.80  145.26  155.33  161.96  143.32           
             
             
             
                   
             
             
                     
             
             
                   
           
             
             
             
124.09 137.28 148.63 152.12 132.97
Goa 87.83  88.79  85.73  90.06  107.20 97.25 88.81 75.69 73.94 78.51
Gujarat 103.22  105.80
 
  108.29  103.38
 
  94.12 95.26 85.52 73.83 77.50 91.50
Haryana 77.43 64.84  69.90 75.23  80.73 83.85 81.19 82.31 78.50 88.74
Karnataka 82.08 87.32 81.48 81.49  94.20 88.03 81.74 87.47 78.35 83.09
Kerala 155.22  158.76  140.31  138.77  118.13 118.39 128.16 137.42 142.27 127.38
Madhya 
Pradesh 76.55  82.13  84.31  76.24  74.78 84.42 81.76 83.83 66.71 66.47
Maharashtra 93.81 84.62 91.58 91.54 99.95 97.25 103.13 125.81 135.61 113.04
Orissa 92.27  92.79  94.17  80.30  84.76 77.59 75.13 79.96 86.85 104.92
Punjab 88.97  86.21  92.78  94.97  92.69 107.89 105.44 92.33 87.35 110.84
Rajasthan 91.57 96.06 86.64 99.14  106.34 113.50 110.98 110.19 113.97 110.51
Tamil Nadu  103.67  101.49  104.13  99.85  101.59 115.07 113.26 111.15 113.08 90.79
Uttar Pradesh  95.24  95.09  107.87  105.97 98.92 115.57 96.23 101.97 105.08 96.91
West Bengal  132.54  126.45  122.78  123.72 126.65 113.17 135.14 112.17 116.25 131.34
Average 100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Maximum             
                   
155.22  158.76  155.33  161.96  143.32 124.09 137.28 148.63 152.12 132.97
Minimum 76.55 64.84 69.90 75.23  74.78 68.67 75.13 73.83 66.71 66.47
Source( Basic Data): Finance Accounts, State Governments 
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Appendix Table 4: Share of Expenditure on Health as Percentage of Primary Expenditure 
excluding Pension Payments Realtive to Average for General Category States 
    1993-94 1994-95 1995-96 1996-97 1997-98 1998-99 
1999-
2000  2000-01 2001-02 2002-03 
Andhra  Pradesh 92.86 88.50 85.18 92.39 85.47 75.47  84.90  86.00 84.41 85.38 
Bihar  98.12  105.79 101.96 113.09  98.97 90.05  88.38  99.83  101.51  93.32 
Goa  136.42 137.56 132.25 144.25 134.74 131.44  124.00  114.17 113.37 106.25 
Gujarat  103.30 109.81 109.44 103.74  93.40 94.29  97.13  74.41 71.54 87.98 
Haryana  65.74 56.73 62.42 63.72 67.37 69.52  72.62  70.87 62.62 71.31 
Karnataka  86.53 91.87 77.76 72.49 80.55 82.80  90.36  85.15 80.96 82.24 
Kerala  131.99 139.45 135.72 130.80 114.36 114.23  130.44  141.25 165.90 129.18 
Madhya  Pradesh 68.50 78.81 76.52 73.77 78.21 90.68  83.43  94.86 70.71 75.01 
Maharashtra  80.64 73.93 77.74 71.73 78.59 71.24  74.28  80.09 90.31 77.11 
Orissa  76.46 79.68 81.76 85.59 85.90 82.97  74.47  84.89 82.91  101.62 
Punjab  102.67 104.81 102.50 110.88 109.82 134.03  140.43  124.86 121.44 138.01 
Rajasthan  95.84 101.76 91.66 101.76  104.59 113.44  114.14  117.59 118.42 112.98 
Tamil Nadu  99.31  97.93  107.89  95.25  102.05  106.23 108.95 106.85  111.04 91.22 
Uttar Pradesh  113.10  94.49  115.35  108.94  120.42  91.68  87.48  90.91 93.78 94.64 
West  Bengal  148.51 138.87 141.83 131.59 145.57 151.93  128.99  128.25 131.08 153.75 
Average  100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00  100.00  100.00 100.00 100.00 
Maximum  148.51 139.45 141.83 144.25 145.57 151.93  140.43  141.25 165.90 153.75 
Minimum  65.74 56.73 62.42 63.72 67.37 69.52  72.62  70.87 62.62 71.31 
Source( Basic Data): Finance Accounts,  State  Governments        
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Annexure 1: Canadian Methodology of Determining Equalization 
Grants 
 
The equalization transfer to a province in absolute amount is 
determined by applying the average revenue effort to the difference between 
standard base and the actual base for that province with respect to the 
various revenue sources. This produces an estimate of revenue, which is 
higher than the actual revenue for provinces that have ‘below- average’ 
capacity. This exercise is done for all revenue bases used by the provinces. At 
present, there are 33 such revenue bases, which include tax revenues, 
royalties and user charges. This system of calculating the ‘notional’ revenue 
performance is called the ‘Representative Tax System’ (RST), where each tax 
or revenue source is considered individually and the ‘average’ or 
‘representative’ tax effort is applied to the difference between the standard 
revenue base and the actual base. Let the provinces be indicated by subscript 
i and revenue sources by superscript j. In specifying the equalization grant 
formula the following symbols may be used: 
Ni : population of province i 
Ri : revenue of the ith province from a given source 
bi: per capita revenue base (total base:  B= Ni*bi) of a given source 
ax: all-province average tax rate for a given revenue source 
ri : actual per capita revenue of the ith province from a given source 
bs : Per capita standard tax base 
 
    The subscripts x and s are kept different to emphasize that, as in 
Canada, in calculating the average tax rate and the standard tax base, the 
provinces included in the respective exercises may not constitute the same 
set.                      
 
The average tax rate, considering the ten provinces is defined as                                              38
                ax = ∑ Ri/ ∑ Bi = ∑Ni ri/ ∑Ni bi          (i=1, 10)       … (1) 
A benchmark revenue base is derived from the revenue bases of 5 selected 
provinces.  At present this list excludes Alberta and the four Atlantic 
provinces. The per capita benchmark revenue base for a given revenue 
source may be defined as below.  
                 bs = ∑Bi/ ∑Ni        [i= 1, .5]                           … (2) 
 
Where bs may be considered as the per capita benchmark revenue base. 
The total equalization entitlement with respect to an individual revenue 
source is determined by 
                   Ei=ax [bs-bi] Ni     if (bs-bi) > 0 
                   Ei= 0                  if (bs-bi) ≤ 0                               … (3) 
      
Total equalization payment for all sources for the i
th province will be 
the summation of such terms for all the revenue sources. Equalization 
operates as a ‘gross’ scheme, i.e.  provinces  with a positive entitlement 
receive their entitlement, but nothing is taken away from those that have a 
negative entitlement.    39
Annexure 2: Methodology for Determining Health and Social Sector 
Grants in Canada 
 
As shown in Rangarajan and Srivastava (2004), the CHST formula for 
cash transfers can be written as  
                              ci=[c*-zq0] +z[q0-qi]                                   …(8) 
 
The various terms used in this equation are explained below:  
           ci  is the per capita cash transfer to the ith province; 
           c*  is  the  normative  per  capita  expenditure  on  health  and  social 
services; 
           z  is  the  tax  points  transfer (13.5 percentage points) applicable to 
personal and corporate income tax bases;  
           qi is the tax base of the ith province (covering personal and corporate 
income taxes); and  
           q0 is the corresponding tax base of Ontario. 
    
The term [c*-zq0] is a constant, z is a fraction  and [q0-qi] gives the 
distance of the per capita revenue base of the ith province from the highest 
per capita base among provinces. It may be noted that in the case of health 
and social transfers: 
 
a.  There is partial equalization with respect to a benchmark state 
which has a mean income and tax base higher than the average; 
and  
b.  That this equalization is over and above unconditional general 
purpose transfers that are also equalisinng. 
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Annexure 3: Methodology of Determining Equalization Transfers in 
Australia 
 
A mathematical presentation of the equalization methodology can be 
given, using symbols defined as below: 
ei = standardized per capita expenditure of state i; γi = expenditure disability 
of state i  
ri = standardized per capita revenue of state i; ρi = revenue disability of state 
i 
oi = per capita special purpose payment of state i;   
ds = per capita budget surplus; d i = ds for all states  
Ni = population of state i; ∑ Ni =population of all states 
 
Subscript‘s’ indicates corresponding numbers for the all-state averages. 
 
The per capita all-state average grant  is given by 
                           gs = es- rs + ds - os                                           …(1) 
The per capita grant to state i is given by 
                          gi = ei- ri + di - oi                                                      …(2) 
 
Here, ei and ri refer to standardized expenditure and revenue for state 
i, di is the standard budget surplus, which is common for all states and oi is 
the given special purpose payment. All standardizations are made in relation 
to corresponding all-state averages which provides the standard, and the 
relevant expenditure and revenue terms can be written as  
                     ei = γi es,  ri= ρi rs                                                        …(3)        
 
For a given state the standardized expenditure and revenue will be 
the summation of  standardized expenditures on different categories and 
standardized revenues from different sources. The SPPs are considered   41
exogenously determined. The CGC determines first the total grants and 
derives the untied grants by deducting the SPPs (oi) that are treated by 
inclusion. Grants inclusive of the SPPs may be written as g* and per capita 
untied grants as g, where 
                     g*i = gi + oi                                                                   …(4) 
           
There are three ways in which the derivation of the share in GST-HCG 
transfers can be presented: the standardized model version, the needs 
version, and the normative gap version. For this purpose, we focus on g* i, 
from which gi is derived by deducting the SPP grants. The needs version of 
the grant equation can be written  
                      g
*
i  = [(γi – 1)es + (1-ρi )rs ]                                          …(7) 
 
This indicates that the essence of the exercise is the departure of the 
disabilities γi and ρi from 1. Further, total grants can be seen as the sum of 
expenditure disabilities and revenue disabilities. This equation also makes 
clear the difference between the Australian and Canadian systems. In the 
Canadian system only the second term, that is, revenue disability is operative 
and no consideration is given to the expenditure side disability. This implies 
that implicitly γi is put equal to 1. The revenue disability (ρi) in Australia is 
measured by the ratio of states i’s revenue base (bi) and the average per 
capita revenue base (bs). Thus,  ρi  = bi/bs. Substituting this in equation 7 and 
setting γi =1, we have  
                      g
*
i =rs -ρi rs = abs – a bi                                                …(8) 
where a =  rs/ bs, i.e. the average tax rate.                   
 
This describes the method of determining untied transfers in Canada 
(see Rangarajan and Srivastava, 2004 for a discussion). 